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The concept of quantum money (QM) was proposed by Wiesner in the 1970s. Its main advantage
is that every attempt to copy QM unavoidably leads to imperfect counterfeits. In the Wiesner’s
protocol, quantum banknotes need to be delivered to the issuing bank for verification. Thus, QM
requires quantum communication which range is limited by noise and losses. Recently, Bozzio et
al. (2018) have demonstrated experimentally how to replace challenging quantum verification with
a classical channel and a quantum retrieval game (QRG). This brings QM significantly closer to
practical realisation, but still thorough analysis of the revised scheme QM is required before it
can be considered secure. We address this problem by presenting a proof-of-concept attack on
QRG-based QM schemes, where we show that even imperfect quantum cloning can, under some
circumstances, provide enough information to break a QRG-based QM scheme.
Introduction
All payment methods are potential targets of thieves
and counterfeiters. Over the course of history, we have
witnessed a race of arms between the counterfeiters and
issuers of various currencies. Remarkably, Sir Isaac New-
ton, who became the master of Royal Mint, enforced
laws against counterfeiting. Nevertheless, the methods
used by Newton become obsolete when it comes to mod-
ern payment methods. With the rapid technological
progress, we are beginning to consider a situation where
counterfeiting is no longer limited by the available tech-
nology, but rather by the laws of nature. An example of
such fundamental limitation is the no-cloning theorem,1,2
which guaranties security of quantum money.3,4
In a recent paper, Bozzio et al.5 reported on an im-
plementaion of a QM scheme based on QRGs.6,7 While
this result brings QM closer to practical implementation,
here we demonstrate that QRG-based QM schemes are
still vulnerable to a new kind of attack (for some typical
attacks see Ref. [8–10]) which can be considered a quan-
tum version of sniffing (a hacking method used to monitor
clasical information). The general idea of our attack can
be used against a broader range of QM schemes based on
QRG11–13 and potentially on other quantum communi-
cation protocols. Thus, our results can facilitate future
practical implementations of QM by providing a method
for exploring the security limits allowed in QRG-based
protocols. For the purpose of our research we have ex-
perimentally recreated the original scheme of Ref. [ 5].
Its working principle can be described as follows: the
bank encodes QM (as a quantum token) using a secret
sequence of qubit pairs chosen from the list of eight op-
tions:
S = {|0+〉, |0−〉, |1+〉, |1−〉, |+0〉, |−0〉, |+1〉, |−1〉} , (1)
where |0〉, |1〉 are logical qubit states, and |±〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉) stand for their superpositions. The se-
quence and its serial number is stored on a quantum
credit card5,14,15 subsequently given to a client of the
bank. Upon payment, the credit card is inserted into
the vendor’s terminal which is supposed to perform pro-
jection measurements on these pairs in a measurement
basis requested by the bank (randomly chosen to be ei-
ther 0/1 or +/- for an entire pair). Then, the terminal
sends the classical outcomes of those measurements to
the bank. The main advantage of this scheme is that the
terminal measurement itself is sufficient for authentica-
tion of the credit card, so quantum states do not have to
be sent to the bank for verification. The bank just checks
the results knowing the specific encoded states and either
accepts or denies the payment. A small amount of errors
is expected to appear in the verification procedure to ac-
count for implementation imperfections. The acceptable
amount of errors needs to be small enough to ensure that
payment by a cloned quantum credit card is denied. In
contrast to the original Wiesner QM scheme,3 no on-line
quantum channel has to be used for payment. Thus, the
verifiability problem as defined by Aaronson and Chris-
tiano16 is at least partially solved.
This protocol is secure against a dishonest terminal
only if each quantum sequence is generated using a truly
random encoding. However, such condition would give
rise to a giant database problem, as discussed in [16] and [
17]. The random sequence approach is highly impractical
or even infeasible. In practice, there has to be one secret
encoding function shared by a certain number quantum
banknotes or tokens (i.e., sequences of quantum states
and their serial numbers). Hence, in our research we
test limitations of sharing a secret encoding by multiple
tokens.
Here, similarly like in Ref. [4], we use quantum cloning
to counterfeit QM. Our approach is virtually unde-
tectable by the bank because we copy only parts of quan-
tum tokens (i.e., quantum sequences). In terms of QRG-
based QM protocol, the attacker utilises a compromised
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2payment terminal enabling quantum cloning of an input
qubit (see Fig. 1). The terminal performs measurements
on both copies of a qubit providing the attacker with
some information on the encoding used by the bank, if
two consecutive qubits from a sequence are cloned. The
frequency of cloning can be arbitrarily small and there-
fore made unrecognisable from noise. After gathering
enough data, the attacker reveals the secret encoding
used by the bank for preparing credit cards. Since then,
they can issue fake quantum credit cards indistinguish-
able from the original ones issued by the bank.
Results
We have implemented the quantum sniffing attack on
the platform of linear optics, where qubits are encoded as
polarisation states of single photons. The optimal cloning
strategy (i.e., maximizing single-copy cloning fidelity) for
copying qubits from the set S is the symmetric phase-
covariant cloning (SPCC).4,8,18 In the experiment, pairs
of input qubits |ψ1ψ2〉in ∈ S were subjected to SPCC
procedure obtaining two clones %ˆ1A ⊗ %ˆ2A and %ˆ1B ⊗ %ˆ2B
of the input qubit pair. These clones were then measured
in the same but random basis. In a QRG-based QM pro-
tocol the basis is selected by the bank. Due to limita-
tions of linear optics based implementations of quantum
cloners,19 the SPCC process is probabilistic and some-
times it fails to deliver the clones. The probability of
successful cloning of one input qubit is denoted P . There-
fore the probability of cloning the entire qubit pair is P 2.
Quality of the clones is expressed in terms of fidelity F
defined as F = Fij = in〈ψi|%ˆij |ψi〉in, where i = 1, 2 and
j = A, B denote the first and the second clone, respec-
tively. The probability of finding both clones %ˆiA and %ˆiB
in a given state |ψi〉in reads F 2. An example of an attack
on a particular qubit pair is shown in Fig. 1.
The theoretical limit for SPCC fidelity18 is F =
1
2
(
1 + 1√
2
)
≈ 0.854 and on the platform of linear optics
the cloning succeeds with probability P = 13 . While the
limit on fidelity is fundamental in its nature, P depends
on the physical platform used in a given implementation
and can be arbitrarily close to 1. However, even on the
platform of linear optics, it is possible to clone at arbi-
trarily high values of P but at the expense of reaching
lower than optimal fidelity F (see hybrid quantum clon-
ers).8,20
The terminal registers two measurement outcomes per
input qubit corresponding to the clones. If the two
clones of one input qubit yield identical results, while
for the other yield opposite results, the attacker gains
information about the encoding. With the probability
Ptot = Pc + Pe the attacker eliminates six of the original
eight encodings (see Eq. 1). One of the two remaining en-
codings have actually been used by the bank. The prob-
ability of obtaining correct information from the attack
is Pc = 12P
2F 2, whereas Pe = 12P
2(1−F )2+P 2F (1−F )
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FIG. 1: Attack on a quantum credit card utilising a hacked
terminal. During a transaction a pair of states (e.g., | + 1〉)
is extracted from the card and cloned. Here, for simplicity,
we depict only the situation where all the qubits are perfectly
copied (the probability of such event is proportional to F 2).
Then, measurements are performed on all four copies in the
basis randomly chosen by the bank (e.g. 0/1). If the mea-
surements on copied qubit pairs produces one of two results
from the bottom block of the table of outcomes, the attacker
learns the originally encoded state (in this case |? 1〉). This
procedure is repeated until a relation between the quantum
states and serial numbers is learned. Since then, the attacker
can issue perfectly counterfeit quantum credit cards.
stands for the probability of getting an erroneous result
due to limited cloning fidelity. Similarly, if the two clones
of each input qubit yield identical results, the attacker
knows that only one of four encodings might have been
sent by the bank.
The attacker is able to learn the method of encoding to-
kens by accumulating measurement results provided that
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FIG. 2: Mutual information Isec versus error rate  for two
fixed probabilities P =
{
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3
; 1
}
. Vertical black dotted line rep-
resents error rate associated with security threshold discussed
in Ref. [11] and [12]. Crosses mark the smallest average error
introduced by optimal cloning for a fixed value of P . Error
rates below these optimal values cannot be reached by any
physical operation (greyed curves). Circles stand for limit of
classical copying (F = 0.75). Thus, the segments of curves be-
tween circles and crosses mark the regime of quantum copying.
It follows from Eq. 3 that classical copying limit in strategy
(ii) always corresponds to intersection between the relevant
curve and the security threshold.
the fidelity is F 6= 12 . The cloning operation inherently in-
troduces errors in the measurement outcomes.1,2 Hence,
the terminal might send to the bank incorrect results. If
the error rate surpasses a given limit (25% in Ref. [5]), the
bank will reject the payment. Thus, it is necessary to in-
troduce a strategy of attack considering all circumstances
of the measurement (i.e., if cloning failed or not) and its
outcomes to minimise the error rate. There are gener-
ally three distinct strategies: (i) to provide the bank with
measurement outcome every time cloning takes place and
even if it fails, send a random value, (ii) to send measure-
ment outcome, only if it is registered by the terminal and
report a lost qubit when cloning fails and (iii) to measure
qubits after their extraction from the credit card in given
measurement basis but do not perform cloning at all.
To quantify the correlations between the attacker and
the genuine token we use mutual information Isec, which
expresses how many bits of information can the attacker
obtain upon cloning one qubit pair. The exact value of
mutual information depends on the strategy used, cloning
success probability P and fidelity F . In case of the third
strategy (without cloning), its value is 12 .
Simultaneously, we denote  the probability of an er-
ror being reported to the bank. The expressions for er-
ror rates  for the two above-mentioned strategies can
be obtained by direct calculations based on analysis of
probabilities of all possible scenarios and read
(i) =
1
2 (1− P ) + P (1− F ) , (2)
(ii) = 1− F . (3)
Equation (2) takes into account two situations. In the
first case, one or both qubits are lost during cloning and,
therefore, random results are reported to the bank (50%
chance of error). In the second case, even if cloning suc-
ceeds, non-unit fidelity may cause the measurement to
yield an incorrect result. The error rate in case of strat-
egy (ii) depends only on imperfect cloning fidelity.
The relation between mutual information Isec (between
the bank and the attacker) and the error rate  for all
strategies is show in Fig. 2. In the figure, quantities Isec
and  are functions of cloning fidelity for 12 ≤ F ≤ 1 for
two cloning success rates P = 13 (linear optics limit)
4,19,20
and P = 1 (deterministic cloning).4,20–22 In case of de-
terministic cloning the two attack strategies coincide, but
for probabilistic cloning the second strategy provides bet-
ter results. It is fair to note that the mutual information
of any simple linear-optical cloning strategy is lower in
comparison with the no-cloning strategy (iii). On the
other hand, with deterministic cloning, one can reach
even higher values of mutual information and therefore
cloning strategies need to be considered for security im-
plications. Additionally, machine learning-based algo-
rithms may require data with as little noise as possible
even at the expense of the overall quantity. Post-selection
on successful cloning events allows to distil such sample.
Corresponding conditional mutual information yields a
significantly higher value when both qubits are success-
fully cloned than for the no-cloning strategy (iii) (Fig.
3).
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FIG. 3: Conditional mutual information Isec versus error
rate . Strategies (i) and (ii) are equal in this case.
To prove the working principle of the quantum sniffing
attack, let us consider a specific encoding of the quan-
tum tokens and demonstrate the attacker’s approach to
4learning the encoding. Here, we assume that the bank
uses a hash function to encode the tokens. Hash func-
tions are designed to return very distinct results even for
similar inputs. The input can be additionally modified
by using a specific secret number (salt). In this case the
hash function is often referred to as salted. For simplic-
ity, let us now assume that the hash function is known to
the attacker, but the salt is secret. For each token pass-
ing through the terminal, the attacker calculates hashes
(outputs of the hash function) of its serial number salted
by numbers from a certain range. This way the attacker
investigates various encodings each corresponding to one
secret number (or salt). Using the information gained by
quantum sniffing, the attacker calculates the number of
agreements (matching qubit pairs) between the predic-
tions of the tested encoding and the measurement out-
comes on real tokens. The encoding with highest number
of agreements is most probably the one used by the bank,
hence the one corresponding to the correct salt.
To showcase the attack, we have implemented token
encoding using several known hash-based functions, i.e.
MD5,23 HMAC-SHA512, HMAC-SHA256, and HMAC-
SHA1 (HMAC – Hash-based Message Authentification
Code).24 Typical example of encoding using SHA512 is
depicted in Fig. 4. In our proof-of-concept experiment,
the salt has been sought only among three-digit num-
bers. To distinguish the secret number from noise orig-
inating from random matches, a sample of 4 040 suc-
cessfully cloned photon pairs (corresponding to 101 se-
rial numbers used in the experiment) has been evaluated.
To optimise the computational resources of the attacker,
the algorithm gradually refines the set of evaluated se-
cret numbers. Periodically it removes secret numbers
with low number of agreements from the list of evaluated
numbers. Once the number of agreements for one se-
cret number surpasses the average number of agreements
by selected multiple of standard deviation, the algorithm
ends and returns that number. Note that due to some
error tolerance, the attacker does not necessarily need to
recreate the original hash function. It would be enough
if they found a function which error rate is below the
security threshold.
The size of HMAC output of all used hash functions
was set to be 40 bytes. As a consequence, the number of
tokens necessary for guessing the secret number was inde-
pendent on the number of digits of their serial number.
For each hash function we have established how many
photon pairs need to be successfully cloned in order to
reveal the secret number with sufficient certainty. The
results are summarised in Tab. I. The number of cloned
pairs needed does not scale with the length of the salt.
The salt length only increases the classical computing
time. Note that these results were obtained using our
experimental results where the average cloning fidelity
was found to be above 80%.
We have also performed a generalised attack in which
the attacker did not know what hash function had been
used for encoding. The attacker only assumes the hash
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FIG. 4: Dependence of number of agreements on all possible
three-digit secret numbers evaluated for 4 040 successfully
cloned photon pairs. The revealed secret number (salt) is
marked by a red circle.
TABLE I: Minimal number of photon pairs cloned for correct
guess of the secret number (salt).
hash-based function number of pairs
HMAC-MD5 1 400 ± 16
HMAC-SHA512 1 192 ± 14
HMAC-SHA256 1 060 ± 14
HMAC-SHA1 1 272 ± 13
function is one from a given set. In this situation, the
attacker has to calculate hashes using all hash functions
in this set to encode serial numbers and count numbers
of agreements as described above. The plot in Fig. 5
shows the search for the secret number among four hash
functions. The tokens were encoded using MD5. Our
results indicate that the correct secret number and hash
function can be revealed assuming the hash function is a
member of a finite set. The size of which is limited by
the available time and computing power.
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FIG. 5: Dependence of number of agreements on all three-
digit secret numbers. Four different hash functions are tested.
The bank used MD5 for encoding. In this plot, 4 040 success-
fully cloned photon pairs were analysed. The revealed secret
number (salt) is marked by a red circle.
5Methods
Photonic qubits were encoded as four polarisation
states located on the equator of Poincaré sphere: |D〉,
|A〉, |R〉 and |L〉 (i.e. diagonal linear, anti-diagonal lin-
ear, right-handed and left-handed circular polarisations).
Thus, the set of possible qubit pairs (1) is given as
S′ = {|DR〉, |DL〉, |AR〉, |AL〉, |RD〉, |LD〉, |RA〉, |LA〉} .
(4)
Experimental setup used in our experiment is shown
in Fig. 6. Photon pairs at λ = 710 nm are generated
in a process of type-I spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC) in a BBO (β-BaB2O4) crystal. The
crystal was pumped by Paladine (Coherent) laser oper-
ating at λ = 355 nm. One photon from each SPDC-
generated pair served as one qubit of the cloned ban-
knote. We used a sequence of half and quarter wave
plates (HWP and QWP, respectively) to implement en-
coding. The second photon from the SPDC-generated
pair was meanwhile used as a cloning ancilla (kept hor-
izontally polarised). Cloning is performed by an unbal-
anced polarisation-dependent beam splitter (BS) which
implements the optimal SPCC process (for detailed the-
oretical description see Ref. [18,19,25], for experimental
implementation see also Ref. [26]). Subsequently, each
photon is projected in the D/A or R/L measurement ba-
sis as requested by the bank (using HWPs, QWPs, and
polarisers). The process of cloning is successful only if
each photon leaves BS by different output port. There-
fore, we are interested in coincidences between both out-
put arms. The detection is handled by single-photon
detectors operating with detection efficiency of around
60% and subsequent electronics. In the experiment, we
have registered individual coincident detections one by
one thus genuinely implementing the protocol described
in the text.
Quality of the clones was quantified by fidelity for both
clones and each possible sequence qubit state (Fig. 7) by
evaluating statistics of observed individual coincidence
events. The average cloning fidelity was calculated to
be (80.3 ± 0.3)% while some clones in the two output
arms had slightly different fidelities. Typical detection
rate was 120 pairs per second.
Conclusion and Discussion
We have successfully attacked a QM scheme based on
QRG.5 This scheme has been implemented in a form of
quantum credit card containing quantum tokens. We
retrieved the secret number (salt) used for preparing
quantum tokens purely by means of imperfect quantum
cloning and computational analysis of measured data (see
Fig. 4 and 5). By learning the exact algorithm for encod-
ing quantum tokens, the attacker is, in principle, able to
produce perfect quantum money counterfeits. It is worth
noting that the optimal strategy of our attack depends
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FIG. 6: Laboratory setup for the quantum sniffing experi-
ment. The setup operates as the compromised terminal from
Fig. 1. Its components are labelled as follows: BS – partially
polarising beam splitter, QWP – quarter-wave plate, HWP
– half-wave plate, PBS – polarisation beam splitter, PC –
polarisation controller, D – single-photon detector.
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FIG. 7: Average fidelity of the first and second clone of a qubit
from the cloned set measured by projections in appropriate
bases.
mainly on a particular implementation of bank’s security
tolerances (e.g., losses) and chosen physical platform for
implementing the attack. For instance, if the attacker
uses deterministic optimal cloning even less qubit pairs
is needed to perform the attack (see Fig. 2).
However, the attack was feasible because the bank en-
coded sufficiently high number of photon pairs using the
same secret number (salt) and the same hash function.
From the data summarised in Tab. I we can deduce that
if the bank changes, e.g., the secret number after less
then 1000 photon pairs, the attacker is not able to reveal
the bank’s secret with sufficient certainty. This leads to
further vital questions regarding tolerance of the bank to
noise and threshold value losses.
6We hope that our results will stimulate further research
on security of QM schemes based on QRG bringing this
concept closer to becoming a fully fledged quantum tech-
nology. Our results indicate that the correct secret num-
ber and hash function can be revealed assuming the hash
function is a member of a finite set. The size of which is
limited by the available time and computing power. How-
ever, this is not a fundamental limitation which might
be lifted if more advanced cryptanalysis or more com-
puting power is applied. Our results indicate that while
the idea of using hash functions might be tempting, it
would be ultimately more secure to store truly random
sequences. The recent progress in data storage technolo-
gies may in fact enable this. Our rough estimate is that
the amount of storage space required for sequences of
random bits used for securing a vast amount of quantum
tokens would be of similar order of magnitude as the size
of Google Earth’s database.
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